It Is too EarLy to dIscuss HIV ELImInatIon
In his model-based analysis, Holtgrave suggested that elimination of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is within the foreseeable, although perhaps distant, future in the United States. 1 Similar sentiments surrounding eradication of HIV are starting to gain attention around the world. 2 Elimination of HIV is an ultimate public health goal, but is it really within our current grasp?
The efficiency of HIV transmission is relatively low 3,4 compared with most infectious diseases. 5 Consequently, not everyone infected with HIV will transmit the virus to someone else, and transmission events are relatively rare at the individual level. However, under these conditions, each year there are currently an estimated 2.5 million new cases of HIV transmitted worldwide 6 and approximately 50,000-60,000 cases in the U.S. 7, 8 Although incidence is declining in some regions and population groups, and even if transmission rates in the U.S. decrease by up to 50% in the next 10 years, it appears that we are still a long way from elimination. It is just too early to practically consider elimination. 9 Holtgrave 1 employed the reproductive number from the simple S-I-S Anderson-May model for a recoverable infectious disease 5 to suggest that HIV elimination is within reach. This model assumes that behavioral and clinical parameters do not change over time, that infected individuals clear infection after a given duration and become susceptible again to reinfection, and that there is no HIV/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome-related (or any other) deaths in the population. Further, the model does not include heterogeneity in infectiousness for people throughout their infection, nor does it consider heterogeneity in the behavior and incidence among diverse population groups. Therefore, this model is inappropriate for assessing the potential eradication of a complex disease such as HIV in a complex epidemiologic setting such as the U.S. 8 But, more important than the model itself is the premise of current discussions; namely, elimination of HIV from populations. In the real world, all we can practically consider from the current situation is that funding be secured for designing and implementing combinations of public health interventions that we believe will have the greatest impact on reducing the risk of transmission in the short term.
It is time to get real by customizing real interven-tions for real people who are at real risk of infection. Such interventions should have the potential to be effective at reducing risk, be feasible to implement, and be acceptable to vulnerable populations, which should be welcome as essential partners. Models can be useful for discerning the interventions that are likely to be the most effective at mitigating epidemic trends in the short term. Practical public health programs should also be coupled with indicators and targets for assessing realistic reductions in HIV transmission in the next five to 10 years. It is not realistic to expect complete prevention of HIV transmission in the foreseeable future, but there is real potential to achieve reductions in risk of infection with sensible public health programs to mitigate HIV epidemics. Wilson and Hosein make two central points. First, they discuss the technical complexities (or lack thereof) in the model employed in my article. They assert that the Anderson-May reproductive rate model I employed ignores key temporal changes in behavioral, clinical, and social parameters, and that deaths due to non-HIV/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) causes are omitted. As noted in the article, all mathematical models have limitations and, therefore, transparency is critical to allow discussion of the pros and cons of various parameter assumptions and particular equations employed in the model. Indeed, model-based policy and programmatic conclusions are stronger when they rest on the output of a variety of different modeling approaches, so the comments of Wilson and Hosein are most welcome. However, I would note that while the model I employed was straightforward in terms of the equations used, a number of complex factors are captured in the empirically based parameter values employed in the model. For instance, the transmission rate [T(x)] of 5.0 discussed in the article was based on the best known estimates for HIV incidence and prevalence in the U.S. This transmission rate of 5.0 is the result of a multitude of behavioral, clinical, social, and population health factors that unfolded in the U.S. from the beginning of the epidemic to recent times. This is also true for deaths from non-HIV/AIDS causes; the prevalence estimate used in the denominator of the best estimate of T(x) is a function of the HIV and non-HIV/AIDS deaths as actually experienced in the U.S., and is therefore incorporated.
Second, Wilson and Hosein argue that elimination of HIV infection in the U.S. is sufficiently distal that we should not focus on it, but rather should focus on setting short-term goals to ensure the best proximal response to the epidemic. I agree that considering the shorter-term goals and actions is absolutely critical; however, I would assert that strategic planning that includes both proximal and distal aspects is important. For instance, in my article I highlighted two sets of congressional testimony that stated it would be possible to reduce the HIV transmission rate by 50% in (variously) five to 10 years in the U.S. [3] [4] [5] My congressional testimony described for each of the five years the specific programs, intensity of service delivery, and resource levels needed to reach a 50% reduction in T(x). I believe we must consider the short-term action steps, resource needs, and immediate outcomes necessary to achieve longer-term impacts.
My article was designed to determine if the shorterterm programs described in my (and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's) congressional testimony were sufficient to cause the HIV reproductive rate (R 0 ) to fall below unity in the long term (and, thereby, indicate that disease elimination was indeed possible even if in the distant future).
A further illustration of this type of use of my original article can be found by considering President Obama's recently released National AIDS Strategy (NAS). 6, 7 In the NAS, the President sets a goal of reducing the HIV transmission rate by 30% (from 5.0 to 3.5) by 2015. My article considers a T(x) value of 3.5 as a specific case; at this T(x) value, the threshold value of D (duration of infectiousness) at which R 0 shifts from less than to greater than unity is 28.58 (a value just less than our base case modeling estimate of D528.73). Hence, if the national target of T(x)53.5 is achieved via the shorter-term actions highlighted in the NAS and its accompanying implementation plan, that is sufficient to lead to a long-term R 0 less than unity, but only if D#28.58. The implication is that meeting these conditions would set the stage for an eventual elimination of HIV in the U.S. (though that would be in the somewhat distant future). I believe it is useful to be able to make some estimate, even if a crude estimate, as to how much long-term impact the short-term NAS goals may have in the future.
Again, I welcome the comments of Wilson and Hosein, and appreciate the opportunity to continue this important dialogue. 
